POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

THE BIAS OF AMERICAN POLITICS:
RATIONING HEALTH CARE IN A WEAK STATE
JAMES A. MORONEt
1
Americans, we are often assured, do not like their government.
The assertion is partially truth and partially myth. This Article
offers a more detailed map of the American political processes, and
applies it to the debate over rationing health care.
Three forces shape our public policies: the first is a distinctive
tendency to bash the state. The scope and intensity of antigovernmental ideology are exaggerated by a second feature of the
American political landscape, the organization of our government.
Fragmented, overlapping, often incoherent institutions blunt
political action-more or less as the Founders intended. 2 Thirdly,
Americans are swift to mobilize politically. Interest groups,
organized lobbies, and ad hoc "action" committees all find this
government comparatively easy to influence. Taken together,
ideology, institutions, and interests systematically bias our public
policies and public debates toward the status quo.
This bias of American politics shapes the paradoxical debate
over health care rationing. The very notion of rationing alarms
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DEMOCRATIC WISH: PRIVATE POWER AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
which won the American Political Science Association's 1991 Gladys M. Kammerer
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1 See JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND
THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 2-5 (1990) (analyzing the American "dread"
of government).
2 The point is often exaggerated, although The Federalistdid call for ambition to
counteract ambition. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 265 (Alexander Hamilton orJames
Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987). The Federalists tirelessly repeated a new
kind of administrative catechism: their government would operate with energy, vigor,
firmness, steadiness, and decision. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 17, 27, 68 (Alexander
Hamilton), No. 46 (James Madison). For a discussion of the subsequent development
of the administrative state from this perspective, see JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A
CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1986) (attempting
to reconcile discourse of Constitution with contemporary administrative apparatus).
See also MORONE, supra note 1, at 66-72 (discussing the Federalist's pursuit of an
ambitious and energetic executive, both at the Constitutional Convention and during
Washington's administration).
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people on all sides, yet few health care systems anywhere are as
heavily rationed as the American.3 The first procedure in any
health care setting is the inevitable "wallet biopsy," a stringent
rationing tool. 4 I contend that the American political system
fosters contradictions in the ways we ration health care and in the
ways we frame potential alternatives. Ultimately, our health care
debate proceeds backwards. My purpose here is to show how and
explain why this is so.
I.

PATTERNS OF AMERICAN POLITICS

A. Ideology: The Distrust of Government
Americans do not like government. 5 The state occupies an
unusually ambiguous place in our society. Public power has long
been viewed as a threat to liberty-James Madison contrasted the
American Constitution with the European legacy of Magna Carta as
a charter of power granted to liberty rather than a charter of liberty
granted by power. 6 The preoccupation with limiting government
has remained a vivid feature of American political life. Tocqueville
reported, "the society acts by and for itself..., so feeble and
"7
restricted is the part left to [government] administration.
Even as the American administrative state began to take its
contemporary form, somewhere between the two Roosevelt
administrations, the anti-governmental impulse remained. For
example, Americans developed their social insurance programs far
more reluctantly than did most Western democracies. In Europe,
benefits were generally proffered from the political center by
statesmen bidding for the allegiance of workers. Bismarck, Lloyd

3 See Leonard M. Fleck,Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking
Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1602 (1992); David Mechanic, ProfessionaJudgment
and the Rationingof Medical Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1713, 1745-46 (1992).
4 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 436

(1982) (discussinghow physician's economic power has replaced their former cultural

authority).
5 See MORONE, supra note 1, at 4 (arguing that a pervasive American "dread" of
government has been repeatedly overcome by broad reform movements seeking to
restore power to the people).
6 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787,

at 601 (1969); id. at 593-615 (noting that the Revolutionary period was marked by a
pervasive civic republicanism that gave way to incipient liberalism by the time of the
Constitution's drafting).
7 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 53 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner

eds., George B. Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (12th ed. 1848).
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George, and Napoleon III each sought to coopt the working classes
with social insurance programs.8 In the United States, the political
payoffs from such programs are not often noted and new socialwelfare programs not often won. The American social-welfare
debate focuses more on the dangers from prompting laziness than
the opportunities of promoting loyalty.9 When new programs are
proposed, they provoke the same anti-governmental reflex that
shackled the government's early development. Throughout most of
the twentieth century, great cries about looming socialism accompanied the government bashing.
Louis Hartz described the result as "American exceptionalism,"
a distinctive opposition to the state that weakens every move toward
government programs, let alone toward class-based politics or
socialism.1 0 Granting old age benefits, financing health care
publicly, legitimating labor unions, legislating civil rights, fluoridating water, regulating industry, and a multitude of other policies all
elicit a similar response. New forms of state authority, even those
that extend narrow benefits to broad constituencies, evoke the
1
charge that an overreaching state threatens the people's liberty.'
8 See GASTON V. RIMLINGER, WELFARE POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EUROPE,
AMERICA AND RUSSIA 60-61, 112-22 (describing the formation and political uses of
welfare state programs); STARR, supra note 4, at 237-40 (same).
9 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY
TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989) (demonstrating how images of poverty shaped social
welfare programs); ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN
AMERICA (1974) (showing how views of deserving and undeserving poor shaped
Medicaid).
10 See LouIs HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 3-23 (1955) (arguing that
the absence of a feudal tradition results in the absence of class politics and,
consequently, a truncated political spectrum defined by a fundamentally Lockean view
of politics). An extensive literature follows, attacks, and defends this influential
analysis. Perhaps the best single statement of the Hartz thesis and its critics is byJ.
David Greenstone, PoliticalCulture andAmerican PoliticalDevelopment: Liberty, Union,
and the Liberal Bipolarity, in 1 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1
(1986).
" The rhetoric goes back to the American colonists' cry against George III's
"multitude of New Offices" and "swarms of Officers." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776). The anti-Federalists greeted the proposed
Constitution with the same rhetoric. See James Madison, The Federal Convention:
Madison'sNotes ofDebates, in THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 71, 107-08, 335-38 (Winton U. Solberg ed., 1958).
See generally THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST (J.R. Pole ed., 1987)
(collecting anti-Federalist writings). For an effort to trace this anti-governmental
theme through American political development, see MORONE, supra note 1. See also
TheodoreJ. Lowi, AmericanBusiness, PublicPolicy, Case Studies, and PoliticalTheory, 16
WORLD POL. 677,690-707 (1964) (book review) (distinguishing the passionate broad-
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At times, the ideology is articulated with great gusts of hyperbole. For example, school desegregation left Southern editorialists
speculating how "[t]he communist masses of Russia and Red China
must have howled with glee." 12 The Kennedy administration's
scaled back Medicare program would lead us to "awake to find that
we have socialism.... [O]ne of these days you and I are going to
spend our sunset years telling our children and our children's
13
children what it once was like in America when men were free."
Recently, the dread of government has been articulated in more
14
sober, but equally passionate terms: "no new taxes."
Observers of American health care are familiar with this theme
of government distrust. It is, we are frequently told, the reason
Americans have no national health insurance; it is the reason a
national health scheme such as Canada's remains "'off the radar
screen of American possibility."''15 Although this ideology runs
long and deep in America politics, it is also overstated. There are
other legacies in American political history. Hamilton's "energy" in
government, 16 Lincoln's "political religion of the nation, " 17 and
Franklin Roosevelt's "four essential human freedoms"1 8 are all
familiar visions of a radically different nature-visions of a strong
and active state.
Indeed, anti-statist rhetoric failed to bury any of the examples
noted above-social security, Medicare, protecting voting rights,
business regulation, and water fluoridation are all unexceptional

based response to "redistributive politics" from the easy incremental politics of
"distributive" and "regulatory" policies).
12 Tom Brady, Communist Masses Howled With Glee on Black Monday, in THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 71, 73 (Henry S. Commager ed., 1967).
13 MAXJ. SKIDMORE, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN RHETORIC OF RECONCILIATION
127-28 (1970) (quoting Ronald Reagan).
14 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 212 (14th ed.
1990) (quoting George Bush in the 1988 Presidential campaign).
15 Theodore R. Marmor &Jerry L. Mashaw, Canada'sHealth Insuranceand Ours:
The Real Lessons, The Big Choices, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1990, at 18, 25 (quoting Alain
Enthoven).
16 For a discussion of Alexander Hamilton's administrative vision, see MORONE,
supra note 1, at 66-68.
17 Abraham Lincoln, Address Before The Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield,
Illinois (Jan. 27, 1837), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 148, 155 (Arthur

Brooks Lapsley ed., 1905) (discussing the necessity of respect for the laws and
institutions of government).
18 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Annual Message to the Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT: 1940 VOLUME 672
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941) (articulating four essential human freedoms,
including freedom from want).
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duties of the American state today. The American fear of government matters, but it is only part of the political story.
B. Institutions: Fragmented Government

Anti-statist ideology is built into the chaotic fragmentation of
American political institutions-and commonly celebrated as checks
and.balances. "No other nation," report Peter Marris and Martin
Rein, "organizes its government as incoherently as the United
States." 19 The political chaos "leaves most reforms sprawling
helplessly in a scrum of competing interests." 20 The President and
both houses of Congress pursue their own agendas; in the past
century and a half, the three bodies have been divided by party forty
percent of the time, by region and institutional loyalty constantly. 21 Together, they compete to oversee a federal bureaucracy that
is in many ways beyond their control. The President, for example,
names little more than one-tenth of one percent of federal office
22
holders.
Political programs must pass through the presidency, Congress,
the federal bureaucracy, and then negotiate the layers of American
federalism-regional governments, state government, sub-state
regional bodies, counties, and local governments, each of which is
divided by function. 23 The courts intervene at every stage. To
pass this gauntlet, proposed programs are typically oversold
(promising all kinds of benefits to all sorts of constituencies) and,
at the same time, heavily compromised. 24 The combination
creates an often-sampled recipe for disappointment.
19 PETER MARRIS & MARTIN REIN, DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM: POVERTY AND

(1967); see id. at 113-19 (attempting to
explain the formation and fate of President Johnson's war on poverty).
20 Id. at 7.
21 See MORONE, supra note 1, at 10.
COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES 7

2 SeeJames A. Morone, Representation Without Elections: The American Bureaucracy
and Its Publics, in REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 283, 294 (Bruce Jennings &
Daniel Callahan eds., 1985) (reviewing models of representation as they apply to
American
federal bureaucracy).
2
3 See THOMAS j. ANTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY (1989)
(describing American federalism); Morton Grodzins, The FederalSystem, in AMERICAN
FEDERALISM IN PERSPECTIVE 256, 257 (Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1967) (describing the
overlap of agencies and functions in the U.S. government).
24 See, e.g.,JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH (1987) (describing
the special interests that were catered to during negotiations leading to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986).
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The chaos of checks and balances is rooted in the Constitution
and was exacerbated by succeeding reform generations. In the vain
hope of getting beyond politics, wave after wave of American
reformers have organized new agencies designed to be independent,
expert, and apolitical. For example, reformers organized the civil
service in 1883 to meet these specifications, promising that the
result would be honest and efficient government. 25 Additional
examples range from independent regulatory agencies (beginning
with the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887)26 to the
Health Care Finance Administration (formed in 1977).27 The new
agencies swiftly added to the uncoordinated, fragmented character
of the American regime; they quickly found themselves bogged
28
down in the politics they were designed to avoid.
The result is a political framework geared towards narrow
incremental changes best negotiated by individual, independent
agencies with narrow jurisdictions.
The system is especially
maladroit at securing broad policy changes that require coordination from the political center. For instance, when the Supreme
Court took a leftward turn and championed desegregation, it was
frustrated for more than a decade by Congress, executive agencies,
state governments, county and municipal officials, and local school
boards. 29
By contrast, our government is well-designed for
granting agricultural subsidies or damming rivers.
The bias of our political institutions can easily be misread as an
American bias against government action. National health insurance offers a familiar example. Americans may be skeptical of their
state, but Harry Truman was elected, in 1948, touting universal
government health insurance as his major domestic issue3 0 While
his promise to "remove the financial barrier to health care" played
25 See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 47 (1982)
(tracing the structural reform of the American civil service and the military).
26 See GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 281 (1966)
(describing the institutional fragmentation that resulted from the Progressive ideal).
27 See FRANKJ. THOMPSON, HEALTH POLICY AND THE BUREAUCRACY (1981) (tracing
the design of the federal health bureaucracy).
28 On the impossibility of apolitical government, see James Morone, Hidden
Complications: The IronicFlaw of Health CareCompetition, in AM. PROSPECT (forthcoming Summer 1992). For an historical account, see MORONE, supra note 1, at 119-23.
29 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1977); WITH ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED (John H. McCord ed., 1969).
30 See STARR, supra note 4, at 284-86.
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well on the campaign hustings, it was repeatedly rejected in
Congress. 31 In a parliamentary system free of checks and balances, one party (or coalition) would control the legislature, the
executive office, and the bureaucracy. In such a setting, the
Truman administration would have had the opportunity-indeed, it
would have been expected-to legislate its major campaign promise.
An America that operated under English (or Canadian or German)
institutional rules would likely have legislated national health
insurance several times over. This elusive reform has been wrecked
as much by the organization of our government as by public
skepticism about government health policies. Of course, a consistently stymied state exacerbates public contempt, fostering the
ideology described in the preceding section.
C. Interests: The Politics of Conflict

An entirely different line of inquiry focuses on the politics of
clashing interests. Proponents of this perspective note that the
United States has had plenty of reformers, socialists, and class-based
movements. Their successes and, more often, their failures were
forged in political conflicts. Power has always been the crux of the
matter. One traditional reading of American political development
interprets it as a long series of clashes between entrenched haves
and aspiring have-nots.3 2 National health insurance, in this view,
was repeatedly defeated by powerful, self-interested opponents-the
American Medical Association in 1935 and 1948, a3 or the health
insurance industry today.34 Ideology and institutions are important as mechanisms employed by self-interested groups resisting reform.
31 See MORONE, supra note 1, at 258.
32 This view is associated with the Progressive tradition of American historiography. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONsTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) (arguing that the Founders were motivated by
class interests); VERNON L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
(1930) (claiming that American intellectual history is cast in the Progressive rubric of
class conflict). For a lengthier discussion, see MORONE, supra note 1, at 19-23.
3 See STARR, supra note 4, at 266-89. Theodore R. Marmor traces the conflict
between reformers and medical opponents in the fight for Medicare and emphasizes
mobilization of interests and institutional settings. See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE
POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1970). For an especially potent critique of medical interests,

see Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938 (1954).
3 See Ronald Pollack & Phyllis Torda, The PragmaticRoad Toward NationalHealth
Insurance, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991, at 92, 99 (describing the opposition of
insurance companies to national health insurance).
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The emphasis on interests highlights a third distinctive feature
of the American political scene: broad and persistent participation
at every point in the political process. This theme, too, has a long
legacy. William Penn crystallized the "noisy" politics of his colony
with an oft-quoted plea: "For the love of God, me and the poor
country, be not so governmentish."3 5 The settlers ignored him, he
later complained, and remained "open and noisy in their dissatisfactions." 36 A century-and-a-half later, Tocqueville reported: "It
must be seen to be believed ....
Almost the only pleasure an
American knows is to take part in the government and discuss its
measures."3 7 Americans help themselves, concluded Lord Bryce
in 1888, and they "did not care whether [their functionaries] were
skillful or not."3 8 Americans (or rather white males) won voting
rights early in the nation's history and rapidly developed an ethos
of civic participation and interest group formation. 39 Although
two radically different interpretations of America's participatory
political culture exist, 40 most political scientists focus on the
proliferation and influence of interest groups as "perhaps the
feature of political power must characteristic of American democracy."

41

The proliferation of groups continues. Political scientists once
celebrated the resulting interest group pluralism as a bulwark for

35 BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 64-65 (1967).
36 Id.
37 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318-19 (Henry Reeve trans.

& ed., Cambridge, Sever & Francis 2d ed. 1863);seealsosupratext accompanying note

7.

8 2JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 485 (AMS Press 1973) (1888).
39 See Ronald P. Formiasano, Deferential-ParticipantPolitics: The Early Republic's
Political Culture, 1789-1840, 68 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 473 (1974) (discussing voting
changes and their implications); see also EDWARD PESSEN,JACKSONIAN AMERICA (Illini
Books 1985) (1969) (describing the ethos ofJacksonian America); ROBERT V. RIMINI,
THE REVOLUTIONARY AGE OF ANDREWJACKSON (1976) (same); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE
OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1984) (same); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC

(1984) (same).
40 Roughly speaking, one is a class-based view that can be identified most clearly
with the Progressive and New Left historians, see supra note 32, and the other is a
group-theory view that replaces broad, relatively fixed socioeconomic classes with far
more fluid interest-group formation. See MORONE, supra note 1, at 19-23 (contending
that these apparent alternatives are, ultimately, different levels of analysis). For a
thoughtful historical perspective on this subject, see Edmund Morgan, Conflict and
Consensus in the American Revolution, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 290
(Steven G. Kurtz & James K. Hutson eds., 1973). Samuel Huntington provides the
view from a "consensus political scientist." See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN
POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 5-10 (1981).
41 MCCONNELL, supra note 26, at 3.
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democratic participation. Today, they call it "hyperpluralism" and
generally lament the resulting stalemate. 4 2 In sum, an activist
interest group culture operates within a sprawling, fragmented state
that is always vulnerable to challenges of illegitimacy. One result is
that organized interests can influence policies at multiple points in
the political process.
The broader consequence is that ideology, institutional design,
and the politics of both interests and groups all cast the same biases
into American politics. Change is difficult to introduce, and the
broader the change, the more difficult the task. Large scale
innovations require the construction of broad coalitions among both
private groups and public agencies; opponents can successfully resist
in any of the political arenas through which all reform must pass.
On the other hand, organized interests can far more easily win
discrete benefits from legislative committees or bureaucratic
agencies. The overwhelming bias is toward incremental adjustments
to the status quo.
The very idea of systematically rationing a scarce good such as
health care runs directly counter to all the patterns I have described. Rationing requires hard, visible decisions with identifiable
winners and losers in a well-defined political setting. The preceding
sections each present obstacles to doing so. First, American
rationers would have to meet challenges to the legitimacy of a
public effort. Second, any effort is apt to involve a multiplicity of
agencies; a recent effort to ration health care in Oregon is now
debated, notjust in that state, but in the federal bureaucracy, in the
Health Care Finance Administration and the Office of the Secretary
of HHS, in Congress (on and off relevant committees), and in
studies by the Office of Technology Assessment. This bureaucratic
fragmentation, in turn, offers multiple venues for rationing losers
who organize, join coalitions, and struggle for their benefits-what
rationer would relish the prospect of facing an aroused American
Association of Retired People (with politicians inevitably in tow)?
Or, for that matter, the Children's Defense Fund? Or ACT UP?
Rationing requires precisely the attribute that is in shortest supply
42 On pluralism, see ROBERTA. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); DAVID B. TRUMAN,
For a discussion of the strengths and
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
weaknesses of the pluralist tradition, see J. David Greenstone, Group Theories, in 2
THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 243 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby
eds., 1975). On "hyperpluralism," see BRYAN JONES, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA
190-92 (1983).
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in American government: centralized political strength. The next
section unpacks the consequences for rationing health care.
II. RATIONING HEALTH CARE
The American health care enterprise is now in its third decade
of a cost crisis. Richard Nixon first sounded the alarm in 1969. 4s
By any measure, the health care industry's expansion has been
phenomenal. The United States devoted an extra percentage of
GNP to health care every forty months through the 1980s. 44 While
our rate of health care spending accelerates in the 1990s, most
other nations of the Organization of Economic and Development
(OECD) have kept their health spending stable relative to their
45
economies.
Soaring costs have stimulated earnest talk of rationing health
care. After all, advocates reason, unlimited demand for a scarce
good can only be controlled by making tough decisions about who
is to get how much of what. In theory, an extremely wide array of
rationing devices is possible; however, the American political
context as I have sketched it sharply limits the possibilities. This
section will first examine the current state of health care rationing
in the United States and then discuss some strategies proposed for
the future.
A. RationingHealth Care in the United States
46
Many Americans bridle at the idea of "rationing" health care.
They oppose centralized, public sector choices about who gets what.
Just invoking the prospect of government rationing, the "dreaded
R word," is a rhetorical strategy to discredit national health
proposals. 47 It is a predictable political tack. A nation suspicious

43 See STARR, supra note 4, at 381.
44 See James A. Morone, American PoliticalCulture and the Searchfor Lessons from
Abroad, 15J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 129, 130 (1990). The literature documenting
health inflation is enormous. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Could Health Care Swallow
Us All?, Bus. & HEALTH, Jan-Feb. 1990, at 47 (a satiric account forecasting 100% of
GNP going to medicine by the year 2072).
45 See Martin Pfaff, Differences in Health CareSpending Across Countries: Statistical
Evidence, 15J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1, 2 (1990).
46 See, e.g.,Joseph A. Califano,Jr., RationingHealth Care: The UnnecessarySolution,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1525 (1992).
47 Lawrence D. Brown, Remarks before the UNY*CARE Commission (Universal
Health Care for all New Yorkers) (Dec. 12, 1990); see also Lawrence D. Brown, The
National Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 28, 31
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of its government regularly shapes its public policies in a way to
avoid explicit, visible decisionmaking by public officials. There are
numerous ways to do so.
The most direct way to avoid conscious political choices is to
hide them or shift them to the private sector. Thus, a roundabout
government policy that induces or even coerces employers to offer
insurance is widely touted as more politically practical than direct
government insurance. 48 The preference for invisible choices
explains the fundamental paradox of the American discussion about
rationing: the industrialized nation in which medical care is least
accessible to a large number of citizens-and in that sense, the
nation that most tightly rations medicine-is the one in which
attempts to ration health care explicitly are political dynamite.
That Americans ration medicine is, by now, a familiar claim to
even the most casual observer of health care. Some thirty-seven
million Americans have no health insurance and, as a result, are
likely to encounter serious obstacles to getting care. 49 One study
found that as many as sixty million people spent some time without
insurance in a recent eighteen month period. 50 Another survey
reported that the fear of losing health insurance dissuaded
individuals from switching jobs in three out of ten American
51
households.
The American way of rationing is to decentralize (in political
terms, hide) the choices; the result is rationing through an accumulation of narrow public policies, private decisions, and luck. Access
to health care depends, most importantly, on where a citizen falls in
the extraordinarily complex pastiche of health insurance programs.
In New York, Medicaid covers citizens eligible for Aid to Families
[hereinafter Brown, Rationing Plan] (noting business leaders' ambivalence to
rationing).
48 See Lawrence D. Brown, The Merits of Mandates, 15J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.

793, 794 (1990).
4' The actual numbers are subject to political redefinition. The Bureau of the
Census set the number of uninsured at 37 million nonelderly Americans in March
1987. See Katherine Swartz, Why RequiringEmployers to Provide Health Insuranceis a
Bad Idea, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 779, 780 (1990). In 1988, the census
changed the questions on health insurance surveys and got a number of 31 to 33.5
million. Id. For a detailed accounting of the numbers, see KATHERINE SWARTZ, THE
URBAN INST., THE MEDICALLY UNINSURED: A SPECIAL FOCUS ON WORKERS (1989).
50 See Katherine Swartz & Timothy D. McBride, Spells without Health Insurance:
Distributionsof Durationsand Their Link to Point in Time Estimates of the Uninsured,27
INQUIRY 281, 281-85 (1990).

51 See Erik Eckholm, Health Benefits Foundto Deter Switches inJob, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 1991, at Al.
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with Dependent Children (AFDC) with income during the first four
months of employment of up to 113% of the poverty line; in Texas,
those whose incomes reach only twenty-three percent of the poverty
line are not eligible. 52 For other citizens, employers made the
crucial access decision when they chose to offer (or not offer, or
limit) health benefits. Insurers, in turn, influence the prospects for
coverage by deciding how aggressively to manage their risk pool; the
consequences range from higher premiums, to no coverage for preexisting medical conditions, to no coverage at all. Of course, the
entire insurance issue is beside the point in poor neighborhoods
53
where providers have left or gone bankrupt.
In short, our rationing choices are scattered throughout the
public and private sectors. American health care rationers include:
employers; insurers; providers, who decide where to open offices
and how to deal with those who cannot pay; citizens who can decide
to seek new jobs, buy private insurance, or risk going bare; fifty
state Medicaid programs; and a host of other national, state, and
local programs that range from Medicare to local hospital subsidies.
The same uncoordinated array of actors makes the decisions that
keep medical inflation soaring.
The issue is not whether to ration health care. Rather, the
debate is about replacing a typical American policy pattern of
fragmented, hidden, and private decisions with the kind of choice
our system is especially ill-geared to make-conscious, collective
decisions made at the political center.
In practice, we face two different kinds of decisions about who
is to get which medical resources.
One kind are the macro
allocational choices about the nature of the health care system-how
should the health system as a whole operate? These decisions
grapple with the broad questions of financing and access; they are
brought to the political surface by reformers advocating national
health insurance or systematic market competition. A second kind

52 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE,
100TH CONG., 2D SESS., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS

app. A at 285 tbl. A-3 (Comm. Print 1988).
3 See, e.g., ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE 12 (1991) (noting
that the two clinics that remained near the Henry Homer Homes in Chicago both
shut down in 1989); see also James Fosset et al., Medicaid and Access to Child Health
Carein Chicago, 17J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming Summer 1992) (providing a more systematic account of the absence of providers in poor neighborhoods in
Chicago).
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is micro questions about selecting among claims for scarce medical
resources.
The micro questions are not sensibly divorced from the macro
ones. It makes no analytic sense to talk about tough allocational
choices at the individual level before we decide about financing,
funding, and cost control. Indeed, this is precisely the lesson from
comparative health policy. Other nations construct their national
health programs by first designing and debating the macro issues
and then using rationing as one, often minor, way to strike the
balance between cost control and equity. 54 Rationing debates that
begin by asking who is to get what are posing the questions
backwards.
What fails to add up analytically, however, can be understood in
political terms-the policy debate over rationing unwittingly reflects
the nation's institutional bias against broad policy shifts. Reformers
who despair of wresting larger changes from the American political
apparatus turn to the smaller, micro rationing choices as a means
of rationalizing American health policy. Indeed, it is precisely that
frustration that is said to have moved the Oregon reformers to their
experiment with ranking procedures for Medicaid funding. 55 The
effort to reorganize American medicine by examining the merits of
individual claims is shaped by the powerful political dynamics
described earlier. Health care markets have long offered Americans
the promise that individualized choices can, if organized properly,
inject policy coherence into the entire system. 56 The debate over
rationing care, though it often comes from a distinctly different
point on the political spectrum, rests upon the same belief that
fiddling with the standing of individual claimants might result in a
sensible ethical policy.
B. Future Rations

The political framework that sets the rationing question also
shapes many of the answers. Typically, rationing proposals face a
paradox: How to make explicit rationing decisions without vesting
the power of explicit decisionmaking with the government.
54 See Brown, Rationing Plan, supra note 47, at 28; President's Letter:

Simple,

Elegant and Wrong 2, from Bruce C. Vladeck, President, United Hospital Fund (Sept.
1990).
55

See OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMMISSION, PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH
SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE, at xiii-xix (1991).

5 For a broad critique of the market approach, see Morone, supra note 28.
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American public policy offers a rich menu of alternative strategies,
each designed to sidestep the state.
Perhaps the most common way to avoid conscious choices at the
political center is to seek mechanistic, self-enforcing, automatic
solutions designed to operate without politics or politicians. The
benign invisible hand of a properly functioning free market is the
paradigmatic case. The appeal to science holds a similar attractionsimply applying the correct technique will, it is hoped, yield the
correct result. Precision vanquishes politics and the concomitant
deals, special favors, or lobbying groups. A great many recent
health policy nostrums reflect this faith. For example, rather than
explicitly negotiating prices with providers, most American
programs hide the price negotiations in arcane, ostensibly objective,
formulae. Diagnosis Related Groups and Relative Value Scales,
which fix Medicare payments to hospitals and physicians, are good
57
examples.
The lure of science has been especially strong in the health
rationing debate.
Cost-benefit analyses, professional planning
techniques, and the search for appropriate formulae all appear to
offer "objective" justifications for hard choices. A polity that
distrusts its politicians looks for firm ground upon which to ration.
Unfortunately, the numbers are willy-nilly political, resting on
58
assumptions and choices that benefit some and harm others.
The real political advantage is that the methodologies bury political
decisions so that fewer citizens can challenge them.
By obscuring choices, the scientific reflex can be used to
negotiate the political problem of legitimacy. Public officials may
extend their discretion under the cover of precise calculations.
Ironically, the more arcane the rationing process, the better its
political prospects. Eventually, however, the losers are likely to
mobilize, regardless of scientific methods. The larger conceptual
flaw is that this method of rationing repeats the hidden rationing
The
that characterizes the present American health regime.
political advantages are philosophic liabilities.
57 See Morone, supra note 44, at 133; see also James A. Morone & Andrew B.
Dunham, Slouching Towards National Health Insurance: The New Health Care Politics,
2 YALEJ. ON REG. 263,291 (1985) (tracing the political evolution of Diagnosis Related
Groups and speculating that this change will lead to powerful demands for national
health insurance).
58 See, e.g., DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 127-46
(1988) (arguing that in politics, numbers are political constructions).
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An alternate strategy is to take rationing to the people. Open
meetings, citizen committees, and consumer advocates would
hammer out the hard choices. The impulse to return power to the
people is as old as American politics. 59 The citizenry will resolve
the dilemmas that the politicians duck. The trouble with the
democratic ideal is that a heavily biased selection of "the people"
show up at town meetings-the upper middle class (with leisure time
and good government scruples), the most self-interested parties
(often the medical providers and their lawyers), and an occasional
interest group. 60 As a result, citizen participation programs tend
to lurch between apathy and self-interested conflict. In the end,
such efforts tend to be less representative than government
itself.61 The rhetoric of broad participation often obscures the
lack of formal mechanisms of accountability. Offering the public an
opportunity to speak up at a meeting is no substitute for making
decisions and standing for reelection. In addition, finding ways to
systematically represent the citizenry on a special board poses
daunting obstacles, such as who selects them and how? 62 In short,

participatory programs generally prove weak duplicates for what
formal government structures are designed to do, represent the
public. Rather than reinventing the government, and diffusing
accountability for public policy as a result, real democrats would do
better by addressing, attacking, or reforming the state directly. The
call to the people should be seen for what it usually is-the oil of
3
legitimation.

6

There is an exception. Citizen participation programs enable
previously ignored or repressed groups to come forward. Again and
again, participatory programs have shaken up the political establishment with new voices, new concerns, and new forms of politics. For
example, the Community Action Agencies from the War on Poverty
proved a way to inject African American voices into urban govern59 This point and the following argument are drawn from MORONE, supra note 1.

60 Precisely this criticism is raised about the town meetings in Oregon's rationing
experiment. See Brown, RationingPlan, supra note 47, at 40.
61 See Harvey M. Sapolsky, Bottoms Up is UpsideDown, in COMMITrEE ON HEALTH
PLANNING GOALS & STANDARDS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 2 HEALTH PLANNING IN THE
UNITED STATES: SELECTED POLICY ISSUES 143 (1981).

62 SeeJames A. Morone & Theodore R. Marmor, Representing ConsumerInterests:
The Case of American Health Planning 91 ETHICS 431 (1981) (describing the many
representative dilemmas posed by participatory boards in health care).
63 See Rudolf Klein, Control, Participation,and the BritishNationalHealth Service, 57
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 70 (1979).
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ments that had long resisted them. 64 Citizen participation introduces new and often unexpected perspectives; but this is a way to
reform our politics, not fashion public policy over time.
CONCLUSION

Few medical systems ration care as tightly as the American. A
broad array of public policies, private choices, and random
circumstances combine to determine who gets what kind of
medicine. What is most peculiar about the American way of
rationing is its hidden, often haphazard, character. I have argued
that these patterns of health policy reflect the broad features of
American politics-a skeptical view of government, institutional
fragmentation, and hyperpluralism. All undermine the prospects of
more careful, more rational, rationing.
More important, questions about reforming the rationing of
health care cannot be answered sensibly without tackling a prior
question: What kind of health care system do we want? This
Article has suggested why that prior question is hard to answer.
Even so, American political history is full of great reforming battles
that resulted in effective and popular programs. Those who care
about American health care can draw some comfort, and many
cautions, from the patterns of American politics described in the
preceding pages.

See MORONE, supra note 1, at 223-52.

